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“What Cosmopolitans Can Learn from Classical Realists” 
William E. Scheuerman 
International political theory today seem reminiscent of an episode of shadow boxing, 
with participants directing their punches at imaginary antagonists outfitted with crudely stylized 
arguments, but rarely in fact landing a real punch on an actual opponent. Comfortably ensconced 
in the disciplinary subfield of “IR” and committed to the systematic empirical study of 
international politics, Realist political scientists, for example, rarely take notice of the 
remarkable recent revival of Cosmopolitanism, most of whose representatives hail from the 
ranks of normative political philosophy. Caught up in their own internecine methodological 
battles, Realists generally seem oblivious to the efforts of their colleagues (many of whom can be 
found just down the departmental hallway) in constructing ambitious accounts of global justice, 
for example, or novel defenses of global democracy.1 When Realists bother to say something 
about Cosmopolitanism, they tend to confirm their critics’ worst stereotypes. So contemporary 
Realists can be found dismissing ongoing experiments in postnational governance (e.g., the 
European Union),2 endorsing one-sidedly instrumentalist views of international law and 
morality, and going so far as to embrace a thorough-going moral skepticism.3 To the extent that 
 
1  This, at least, is the situation in US political science.  
2  John Mearsheimer,”The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 (1994), pp. 5‐49. 
Tellingly, Mearsheimer’s magnum opus, The Tragedy of Great Powers (New York: Norton, 2001), barely touches on 
international law and international morality, topics on which his mid‐century Realist predecessors dealt with at 
great length and with surprising subtlety.      
3 Danilio Zolo, Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997). Zolo’s is the most 
impressive recent Realist critique of Cosmopolitanism, yet in many respects his is an idiosyncratic Realism. Unlike 
many mid‐century “classical” Realists, for example, he accepts the “subjectivity and contingency” of all moral 
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they engage with Cosmopolitanism, their response consists of recycled accusations of 
“idealism,” “moralism,” and “utopianism.” Cosmopolitanism, they claim, remains blind to the 
fundamental laws of a dangerous anarchical state system, where especially the great powers must 
do everything they can to garner power advantages in relation to their rivals. Any talk of radical 
global reform stumbles in the face of the harsh realities of the “security dilemma,” which today 
as in the distant past requires a more-or-less permanent struggle for power and security among 
independent states.4  
Unfortunately, Realists are by no means alone in their preference for shadow boxing.   
Cosmopolitans have made things too easy for themselves by embracing a simplistic and 
occasionally caricatured interpretation of Realism. Cosmopolitans regularly ignore versions of 
Realist international theory --and especially normatively-minded variants of classical Realism-- 
which offer a serious intellectual challenge, in part because such Realists have endorsed versions 
of both moral and legal-political universalism analogous to those advocated by present-day 
defenders of global reform. Like contemporary Cosmopolitanism, Realism comes in many 
different shapes and sizes. Despite widespread claims to the contrary, influential mid-century 
Realists did not advocate moral skepticism, evince unmitigated hostility to international law or 
international morality, or resist far-reaching global reform (I). Sizable common ground between 
Cosmopolitans and classical Realists can be identified (II). In part because of this shared 
territory, Cosmopolitans will need to pay closer attention to Realist ideas about the necessary 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
values (p. 74). For a critical response to Zolo, see Tony Coates, “Neither Cosmopolitanism nor Realism: a Response 
to Danilo Zolo,” in Barry Holden (ed.), Global Democracy: Key Debates (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 87‐101.   
4 Both “offensive” and “defensive” Realists share these core assumptions (see Christopher Layne, The Peace of 
Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006], pp. 15‐25.)  
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presuppositions of global democracy. For sound reasons, and in opposition to recent 
Cosmopolitans, classical Realists argued that any prospective global democracy would need to 
rest on a mature supranational society capable of performing far-reaching integrative functions. 
They also insisted that any viable postnational polity will need to take on core state or at least 
state-like institutional attributes. Their neglected ideas help identify the Achilles’ heel of the 
present-day preference for “global (democratic) governance without government” (III).  
In short, only a serious intellectual give-and-take between Cosmopolitans and 
sophisticated Realists can allow us to put the tedious intellectual shadow boxing to rest. What 
follows is an attempt to initiate such an exchange.  
I. Against Caricatures 
Recent Cosmopolitanism comes in manifold theoretical and political versions, but what 
they all share is a deep enmity to Realism. So how then do Cosmopolitans typically characterize 
their archrival? 
Realism, we are told, “finds moral considerations unfit for the necessities that 
characterize politics, especially international politics.”5 The source of this enmity to a rigorous 
moral code and especially to demanding conceptions of international morality is its roots in the 
 
5 Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 106. What follows is a composite 
portrayal of Realism based Doyle as well as: Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward 
Cosmopolitan Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 126‐31;  Charles Beitz, Political Theory 
and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), esp. pp. 11‐50; Simon Caney, Justice 
Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West 
(Cambridge, UK:Polity, 2006), pp. 166‐68; David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 74‐5; Charles Jones, Global Justice: 
Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 114‐15.  
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political theories of Machiavelli and Hobbes.6 The former argued in favor of discarding 
traditional moral norms in order to ensure self-preservation in a dangerous political universe; the 
latter insisted that shared conceptions of justice presuppose a system of shared sovereignty. 
Absent a world state, interstate affairs are characterized by a perilous state of nature in which no 
common moral framework can be rendered effective. Realism thus affirms Realpolitik, meaning 
that individual states can legitimately pursue their vital power interests even when doing so 
conflicts with conventional normative prohibitions. Realism’s deep skepticism about 
international law allegedly stems from the same roots. As Machiavelli and Hobbes allegedly 
taught us, binding law requires sanctions backed up by a coercive state apparatus. Because 
interstate affairs remain characterized by anarchy, the regular and effective enforcement of law 
there inevitably is plagued by massive deficits. More often than not, international law --like 
many appeals to a shared moral code—serve as little more than the political instruments of the 
most powerful global political interests or “great powers.” When international morality or 
international law operates effectively, it does so only because significant power interests at the 
global level happen to decide that it is in their interest for them to do so. But in a Hobbesian 
political world, their support always remains fragile.   
Not surprisingly, or so the argument goes, Realism suffers from institutional 
conservatism. Given international anarchy, states can do little more than pursue their “national 
interests.” Of course, the national interests of individual political units occasionally overlap with 
those of competing states; common action and cooperation may then be possible. In a Hobbesian 
                                                            
6  I bracket the question of the validity of this (heavy‐handed) reading of Machiavelli and Hobbes for now. 
Cosmopolitans here follow Martin Wight (International Theory: The Three Traditions [New York: Holmes & Meier, 
1992]), who linked Realism to early modern European political thought. 
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environment, however, such incidents represent the exception to the rule. International 
organization should be seen fundamentally as a tenuous affair, dependent on the cooperation of 
distinct power units whose interests may rapidly conflict. To be sure, the achievement of a world 
state might be morally desirable.7 Yet the basic dynamics of an international system in which 
rival political units compete for power and security render utopian any attempt to establish 
ambitious varieties of global governance. This is why Realists, we are told, remain even today 
committed to maintaining the institutional primacy of the nation-state, despite significant 
evidence that the ongoing process of globalization undermines both its efficacy and legitimacy. 
Their Hobbesian view of international politics constitutes what David Held dubs a “limiting 
factor’ which will always thwart any attempt to conduct international relations in a manner 
which transcends the politics of the sovereign state.”8     
Now there is no question that this account of Realism aptly captures the views of many of 
its present-day representatives. However, it distorts the contributions of Realist international 
theory’s most notable twentieth-century defenders. Just as international political theory has 
witnessed a wide-ranging revival of Cosmopolitanism, over the course of the last decade or so a 
no-less impressive renewal of interest in the writings of so-called classical Realists like E.H. 
Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr has also taken place, mostly among historians of 
international political thought and normatively minded international relations scholars.9 Though 
                                                            
7 Zolo denies this, though many other contemporary Realists at least admit that a world state might represent a 
desirable state of affairs, if it could be achieved, which most ‐‐‐in contrast to their “classical” predecessors—doubt. 
See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 238. 
8  Held, Democracy and the Global Order, pp. 74‐5. 
9  The literature is vast and growing, but see, for example: Duncan Bell (ed.), Political Thought and International 
Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009);  Michael Cox (ed.), E.H. Carr: A 
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generally ignored by Cosmopolitanism, the quest to salvage the achievements of mid-century 
Realism, which combined ambitious normative aspirations with an open acknowledgment of the 
necessity of far-reaching global reform, challenges many widespread theoretical preconceptions. 
Classical Realists and Cosmopolitans, we will see, have more of a common intellectual and even 
programmatic basis than typically recognized. 
To be sure, classical Realism, like any significant intellectual current, was always a 
complex and unwieldy intellectual creature. Hugely influential in the US from the late 1930s 
well into the ‘60s, its ranks included theologians (e.g., Niebuhr), former lawyers (e.g., 
Morgenthau, as well as John Herz and Arnold Wolfers), as well as historically-minded political 
analysts of a radical political bent (e.g., E.H. Carr, Frederick Schuman). The intellectual 
influences on it were no less wide-ranging:10 Niebuhr, for example, was intellectually and 
Critical Appraisal (New York: Palgrave, 2000);  Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the 
Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Christoph Frei, Hans J. 
Morgenthau”: An Intellectual Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001); Richard Ned Lebow, 
The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethic, Interests, and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003);  Robert W. 
Lovin,  Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995);  Alastair J.H. 
Murray, Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics (Edinburgh: Keele University 
Press, 1997); William E. Scheuerman,  Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009);  
Vibeke Schou Tjalve, Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and the Politics of Patriotic Dissent: Realist Strategies of Republican 
Peace (New York: Palgrave, 2008); Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005);  Michael C. Williams (ed.), Realism Reconsidered: The 
Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). From the 
(substantial) previous generation of literature on Realism, Michael J. Smith (Realist Thought from Weber to 
Kissinger [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986]) remains indispensable.  
10  Other classical Realists included, for example, George Kennan and Raymond Aron, though the former was more 
influential as a practitioner than creative thinker, and the latter had little impact on English‐language debates. 
Most definitions of classical Realism associate it with a pessimistic view of human nature as indeed found, for 
example, in Morgenthau and Niebuhr. But some (e.g,, John Herz) rejected such views. The discussion that follows 
should help outline some key attributes of classical Realism. 
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politically linked to the socialist German émigré theologian Paul Tillich,11 as he struggled in the 
1930s and ‘40s to synthesize a fundamentally Augustinian Christian ethics with radical currents 
in social thought; Carr was a great admirer of the work of Karl Mannheim,12 Morgenthau drew 
on a diverse collection of voices, including his Realist ally Niebuhr, but also Hans Kelsen, Carl 
Schmitt,  Max Weber, and the left-wing Weimar legal sociologist and labor lawyer Hugo 
Sinzheimer.13 Not surprisingly, classical Realism had more than its own fair share of internal 
disagreements, despite important commonalities. Yet its core tenets still conflict in pivotal ways 
with present-day Cosmopolitan portrayals. 
So Morgenthau and Niebuhr, for example, both formulated rigorous political ethics. 
Morgenthau relied on philosophical anthropology to argue that human beings inevitably seek 
power over their peers, yet he also insisted that moral action requires “respect for man as an end 
in himself,” demanding of political actors that even in the context of explosive conflicts 
requiring some compromise of moral standards (e.g., the universal condemnation of killing) that 
they heed the call of conscience and reduce necessary compromises to an absolute minimum.14 
For Morgenthau, “the test of a morally good action is the degree to which it is capable of treating 
others not as means to the actor’s ends but as ends in themselves.”15 The tragic contours of 
                                                            
11 Paul Merkley, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Political Account (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1975), pp. 77‐85.  
12 Charles Jones, E.H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), pp. 121‐43. 
13 Scheuerman, Morgenthau, pp. 11‐39. 
14 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Moral Dilemma of Political Action,” in Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958), p. 247.  Though rarely noted in the secondary literature, the Kantian overtones are striking. 
15 Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 196.  
Morgenthau’s key contribution to political ethics, this text rarely even gets referenced in contemporary 
Cosmopolitan summaries of his ideas. For a detailed discussion, see Scheuerman, Morgenthau, pp. 40‐69.   
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existence stemmed in part from the fact that political action required the instrumentalization of 
other persons and thus violations of the moral imperative to treat them as ends in themselves. 
Because humankind was fundamentally both a moral and power-seeking creature, however, 
political actors were required to minimize the resulting evils. The key attribute of admirable 
political leadership in this view was the capacity to fuse a far-sighted assessment of the 
oftentimes ugly realities of political struggle and power politics with a principled commitment to 
moral imperatives: both Hitler and Churchill were masters at the game of power politics, but 
only the latter was deserving of our accolades for combining political prowess with a deep moral 
sensibility. In a similar vein, Niebuhr doubted that a rigorous perfectionist ethics could be 
immediately realized in the political realm, famously accusing Christian pacifists who believed 
in the self-sufficiency of an ethic of love of succumbing to a well-meaning but ultimately 
counterproductive political naivete. However, as one commentator has pointed out, he still 
insisted that political actors ultimately “stand under judgment from a higher ethic (for which 
[Christian] love is the norm).”16 The tensions between politics and morality were clearest, to be 
sure, in the international arena, and thus political actors there typically found it most difficult to 
combine morality with the successful pursuit of power. Yet the dilemmas of political ethics at the 
global level were simply manifestations of deeper enigmas deriving from the fundamentally 
dualistic structure of human existence: we are always both forced to seek power and tame it by 
strict moral means. For neither Morgenthau nor Niebuhr did the political sphere constitute a 
                                                            
16  Colin McKeogh, The Political Realism of Reinhold Niebuhr: A Pragmatic Approach to Just War (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1997), p. 137. For Niebuhr’s political ethics, see especially An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (Cleveland: 
Meridian Books, 1956 [1934]), and Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1960 
[1932]).  
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realm in which actors were to pursue the dictates of power politics free from moral 
considerations.  
   Niebuhr’s political ethics derived its inspiration from Augustine and more recent 
continental Protestant theologians of “original sin,” but hardly Machiavelli or Hobbes. For his 
part, Morgenthau repeatedly criticized Machiavelli and Hobbes, accusing them on numerous 
occasions of having irresponsibly abandoned the western political tradition’s praiseworthy 
aspiration to tame the exercise of power by moral means.17 By demonstrating that ethics, mores, 
and law all played key roles in regulating state action even absent world government, he directly 
countered the standard Hobbesian view that interstate relations could be aptly captured by means 
of the metaphor of the “state of nature.”18 International affairs were not characterized by a norm-
less anarchy, but instead by a complex intermeshing “international society of nations” resting on 
a variety of common moral and legal norms and practices.19 Morgenthau thus argued 
emphatically against not only what he took to be exaggerated expectations about international 
morality and international law, but also against excessively critical assessments which 
downplayed their accomplishments: “during the four hundred years of its existence international 
                                                            
17  For example, see Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, pp. 33, 169, 174‐76; see also the attack on 
irresponsible “Machiavellian utopias” in “The Machiavellian Utopia,” Ethics 55 (1945), pp. 145‐7. Like Niebuhr, 
Morgenthau always sought to distinguish his Realism from cynical variants he associated with Machiavelli and 
contemporary defenders of unmitigated Realpolitik.  
18  Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1st ed., 
1948), pp. 169, 397, where he directly criticized the metaphor of the “state of nature.”  
19  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd. Ed., 1954), p. 479.  On overlap with the “English School,” see Richard 
Little, “The English School vs. American Realism: A Meeting of Minds or Divided by a Common Language,” Review 
of International Studies 29 (2003), pp. 443‐60. 
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law has in most cases been scrupulously observed.”20 Even during moments of extreme crisis or 
emergency, nation-states typically have respected an international moral code: “the fact of the 
matter is that nations recognize a moral obligation to refrain from the infliction of death and 
suffering…despite the possibility of justifying such conduct in the light of a higher purpose, such 
as the national interest.”21 Writing in the immediate aftermath of World War II, he 
understandably worried that modern total war was decimating international law and international 
morality. This remained a source of deep anxiety, however, and hardly a state of affairs to be 
celebrated.    
What then of Realism’s alleged institutional conservatism? In fact, prominent classical 
Realists defended the aspiration to replace the existing Westphalian system of states with a novel 
postnational order. Although deeming proposals for a world state premature, E.H. Carr 
considered the nation-state in crucial respects anachronistic, and he favored locating significant 
powers of economic and security policy making at postnational decision making levels. As 
Andrew Linklater has correctly noted, for Carr “the evolution of common military and economic 
policy” was necessitated by the changing spatial contours of social and economic organization, 
as well as the fact that recent military innovations rendered the whole concept of strategic 
frontiers obsolescent. Their necessary transnationalization “would involve a radical break with 
the moral parochialism of the nation-state.”22 Sharing Carr’s skepticism about immediate 
                                                            
20  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd.ed.), p. 251. 
21 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Twilight of International Morality,” Ethics 58 (1948), p. 82.  
22  Andrew Linklater, “E.H. Carr, Nationalism and the Future of the Sovereign State,” in E.H. Carr: A Critical 
Appraisal, p. 236. A crucial text is E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Macmillian, 1967 [1945]), but see also 
Conditions of Peace (London: Macmillan, 1942), pp. 236‐75, where he outlined a vision of European integration 
along democratic socialist lines. 
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attempts to set up world government, Niebuhr nonetheless conceded that our modern “technical 
civilization,” whose “instruments of production, transport and communication reduced the space-
time dimensions of the world to a fraction of their previous size and led to a phenomenal 
increase” in social interdependence, pointed directly to the realization of an intermeshed “world 
community” and eventually a corresponding world state.23   
Although oftentimes ignored by his normatively numb Realist offspring, Morgenthau 
concluded his famous Politics Among Nations with the claim that the horrors of contemporary 
(and especially atomic) warfare rendered the existing state system obsolete, declaring that only a 
novel reorganization of state sovereignty at the global level could protect humankind from the 
horrific prospects of nuclear war. Even though presently unattainable, the world state represented 
a long term goal towards which anyone sensibly committed to the preservation of the human 
species would have to work.24 In a key but typically neglected section of the text, he endorsed 
David Mitrany’s innovative functionalist model of international reform and applied its tenets to 
the problems of European integration, which Morgenthau described with ever growing 
enthusiasm in many subsequent editions of Politics Among Nations.25 In this, he followed Carr, 
                                                            
23 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944), 
p. 158.  On Niebuhr’s embrace of the world state, see Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan, pp. 86‐92. 
24  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd. Ed.), pp. 469‐502. Morgenthau rejected the apocalyptic view, as 
recently espoused by Kenneth Waltz, that the quest for world government necessarily “would be an invitation to 
prepare for world civil war” (Theory of International Politics [New York: McGraw Hill, 1979], p. 112). This view, by 
the way, is widely voiced today by scholars sympathetic to Carl Schmitt. Despite Morgenthau’s (now) widely 
discussed borrowings from Schmitt, he never endorsed this claim. 
25 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd. Ed.), pp. 492‐93. See David Mitrany is A Working Peace System: An 
Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization (London: National Peace Council, 1946), 
and on Morgenthau’s uses of Mitrany, whom he praised at many junctures, see Scheuerman, Morgenthau, pp. 
129‐34. For useful background on Mitrany, see Cornelia Navari, “David Mitrany and International Functionalism,” 
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whose Nationalism and After had previously discussed the potential virtues of the functionalist 
model of piecemeal international reform, centered pragmatically in concrete nuts-and-bolts 
policy matters nation-states could best tackle by cooperating intimately with their peers, as a 
politically sensible starting point for building an alternative order. Neither Carr nor Morgenthau 
was a principled opponent of far-reaching global reform per se, though both did –as we will 
see—harshly criticize some models of it. Other Realists –including John Herz and Frederick 
Schuman—similarly endorsed the move towards a new supranational polity, like Morgenthau 
emphasizing the ways in which especially the looming possibility of nuclear warfare made the 
existing state system not only risky but potentially cataclysmic. Schuman joined forces with the 
“one-world” movement and endorsed a global federal union as an ultimate goal, while Herz 
devoted many of his writings to an analysis of what he described as the growth of a 
”universalist” orientation that challenged the international status quo.26 
Unsurprisingly in light of this fundamental commitment to global reform, the Realist 
view of the “national interest” is also more nuanced than noted by recent Cosmopolitans. The 
now fashionable term “globalization” does not of course appear in their writings. Nonetheless, 
the classical Realists clearly anticipated key elements of what many more recent analysts have 
placed under its rubric. Consistently hostile to harmonistic accounts that downplayed the ways in 
which rapidly increasing cultural, economic, and technological interdependence potentially 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis: Inter‐War Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995), pp. 214‐31.   
26 John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Herz, The 
Nation‐State and the Crisis of World Politics (New York: David McKay, 1976); Frederick L. Schuman, The 
Commonwealth of Man: A Inquiry Into Power Politics and World Government (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1952). 
Schuman is pretty much forgotten today, but in the 1930s and ‘40s he was a prolific and publicly visible thinker 
who wrote widely not simply for academic journals, but also for political magazines like The New Republic.   
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generates new sources of  conflict, the mid-century Realists nonetheless noted that in an ever 
more interdependent globe, the clear division between “national” and “global” interests becomes 
porous, and hence that “nations now have new and expanded moral responsibilities to each 
other.”27 Writing in The New Republic in 1975, Morgenthau asserted that a sensible 
interpretation of the US national interest entailed “support of supranational institutions and 
procedures capable of performing the functions that in view of modern technological 
developments the individual nation-states are no longer able to perform.”28 This included 
working towards constructing an international agency outfitted with far-reaching authority to 
regulate nuclear energy and the production of nuclear weapons, an idea which he had 
enthusiastically endorsed as early as 1960 and considered indispensable to human survival.29 
II.     A Realist-Cosmopolitan Alliance? 
In light of this revised interpretation of classical Realism, where then can we identify 
analytic overlap with Cosmopolitanism? 
Notwithstanding claims to the contrary, classical Realists did not underwrite moral 
skepticism or relativism. Like contemporary Cosmopolitans, Morgenthau and Niebuhr, for 
example, both endorsed a version of moral cosmopolitanism, along the lines described more 
recently by Thomas Pogge as requiring that we “respect one another’s status as ultimate units of 
                                                            
27 McKeogh, Political Realism of Reinhold Niebuhr, p. 130.  
28 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Explaining the Failures of US Foreign Policy: Three Paradoxes,” The New Republic (October 
11, 1975), p. 21. 
29 Hans J. Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1960), pp. 169‐73, 308‐9. 
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moral concern.”30 Morgenthau, as noted, favored a political ethics according to which moral 
action demands fundamental respect for other human beings as ends in themselves. Although 
typically locating its roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition, he at times left unanswered the 
question of whether it could be justified without theological banisters. Similarly, Niebuhr 
advocated what he forthrightly described as “moral universalism,” defending it on Christian 
grounds. He also observed that the notion of universal moral obligations to other human beings 
qua human beings, however, could be justified by moral and political traditions other than 
Christianity.31 Moreover, both writers conceded that this universalistic morality possessed what 
we might describe as “real-life” consequences: the universal condemnation of killing, for 
example, could be taken as evidence that all the great moral and religious traditions rested on 
respect for human life. 
Yet the Realists did worry that simplistic versions of moral cosmopolitanism potentially 
obscured the necessity of prudence, compromise, and tragic choices. Too often moral 
cosmopolitanism joined arms with a crude political ethics. In countering this danger, Morgenthau 
and others turned to Weber’s ethic of responsibility, which they interpreted-- in some 
contradistinction to its original architect-- as consonant with a rigorous moral universalism. In 
foreign policy making, for example, a crude moral cosmopolitanism motivated actors who 
irresponsibly believed that (US-style) democracy could be pursued everywhere, with equal 
fervor, despite the potential costs, and the fact that it was less likely to be productively advanced 
in some regions than in others: “If universal democracy is the standard of political action, Korea 
                                                            
30 Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” in Chris Brown (ed.), Political Restructuring in Europe: 
Ethical Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 90. 
31 Niebuhr, Children of Light and Children of Darkness, pp. 153‐59. 
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is as important as Mexico, China is as worthy an objective to Canada, and there is no difference 
between Poland and Panama.”32 Writing during the Cold War, they considered this a recipe for 
political disaster. A politically naïve moral cosmopolitanism –this was the crude “moralism” 
they famously decried-- was blind to concrete power relations and downplayed the fact that even 
powerful global actors necessarily operate with limited political resources. Moral aims could 
never be achieved without discrimination. Even the soundest abstract moral principles posed 
difficult practical and political questions, in part because their pursuit might require acts –e.g., 
political violence—that otherwise were rightly condemned. 
They also regularly noted that the intellectual soundness of moral cosmopolitanism did 
not readily translate into an actual empirical consensus about universal moral values or their 
proper interpretation. The same moral idea could mean “something different to an American, a 
Russian, and an Indian” since it was still “perceived by, assimilated to, and filtered through 
minds conditioned by different experiences.”33 This was unavoidable given disparities in social 
existence and especially the national framework within which most moral and political 
experience was still digested: nation states continued to fill the “hearts and minds of men 
everywhere” with narrow “standards of political morality.”34 Morgenthau thus hammered away 
at the simple but telling point that apparent agreement on abstract moral matters often masked 
                                                            
32 Hans J. Morgenthau, “National Interest and Moral Principles in Foreign Policy: The Primacy of the National 
Interest,” American Scholar 18 (1949), p. 210. On Morgenthau and Weber, see Scheuerman, Morgenthau, 94‐100;  
Stephen P. Turner, “Hans J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Max Weber,” in Bell (ed.), Political Thought and 
International Relations, pp. 63‐82. 
33  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd. Ed.), p. 240; also, Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political 
Problems (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953), pp. 28‐9.  
34  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd. Ed.), p. 244. 
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explosive political disagreements. People everywhere should and increasingly do condemn war 
and acts of violent aggression, for example, yet disparities in lived experience meant that social 
and especially national groupings, which filter shared moral ideals in decisive ways, still opened 
the door to explosive political disagreements.35 
Neither Realist criticism poses a necessary challenge to a supple moral cosmopolitanism 
that successfully tackles the complexities and paradoxes of practical action, which even today 
stem partly from disparities in social and national experience where “the same moral and 
political concepts take on different meanings in different environments.” 36 They do, however, 
take aim at naive versions of moral cosmopolitanism, along the lines endorsed by one recent 
defender of global democracy who declares that “it will not be necessary to employ” morally 
deplorably or “evil means” (i.e., political violence) in order to achieve a novel democratic 
postnational order.37 As the classical Realists would legitimately have worried, this version of 
the doctrine ignores the familiar paradoxes of political action: morally good intentions and acts 
can produce counterproductive and morally deplorable consequences, while otherwise immoral 
acts (e.g., the employment of violence) may sometimes be necessary if normatively admirable 
goals are to be secured.     
                                                            
35  For Morgenthau, this was fundamentally an empirical and thus historically contingent fact; readers will search 
in vain for a normatively‐minded nationalist or communitarian argument that abstract moral norms of necessity 
must be concretized in fundamentally different ways by distinct national communities (see part III below).  
 
36 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd. Ed.,), p. 238. 
37 Archibugi, Global Commonwealth of Citizens, p. 287. 
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Classical Realists also subscribed to what Cosmopolitans have described as legal (and 
political) cosmopolitanism, defined by Pogge as a “commitment to a concrete political ideal of a 
global order under which all persons have equivalent legal and duties –are fellow citizens of a 
universal republic.”38 Herz, Morgenthau, and Schuman envisioned the establishment of a unified 
global political order --a world state or global federation-- as a desirable long term institutional 
goal, seeing its construction as essential to peace and security in a dangerous world haunted by 
the specter of nuclear warfare. When contemporary Cosmopolitans defend a similar goal by 
pointing out that in the existing international system “governments therefore have very powerful 
incentives and very broad opportunities to develop their military might, [and that] this is bound 
to lead to the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional weapons of mass 
destruction,” they are reproducing a stock classical Realist argument in defense of global 
reform.39 Like recent Cosmopolitans, classical Realists clearly hoped that a prospective global 
order would take a liberal-democratic form and thus rest on a system of universal rights, though 
they admittedly said relatively little about the institutional attributes of such a regime because 
they considered it a long term aim. Some of them –for example, Carr, Herz, and Schuman-- also 
sympathized with demands for egalitarian social and economic global reforms, positing that far-
reaching social change was inextricably linked to the establishment of new and ambitious forms 
                                                            
38 Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” p. 90. 
39  Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” p. 103. This preoccupation with the perils of interstate warfare, 
however, often fades from other recent Cosmopolitan arguments. Pogge, like the Realists, is right to underline it. 
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of governance “beyond the nation-state.” This position, as well, anticipated a significant strand in 
contemporary Cosmopolitan thinking. 40 
Now one might reasonably challenge my attribution of legal and political 
cosmopolitanism to Realism by focusing, as Simon Caney has recently done, on Morgenthau’s 
disparaging 1979 comments about human rights-oriented foreign policy.41 But the interpretative 
perils here are twofold. First, classical Realists had relatively little to say about the impressive 
growth of human rights law, chiefly because it occurred well after most of them had passed the 
most productive junctures in their careers. Second, Caney and others miss that Morgenthau and 
his allies in fact admired the goal of a world (liberal-democratic) government, and thus were by 
no means opposed to the (eventual) establishment of binding universal rights. When read in this 
light, Morgenthau can be reasonably interpreted as chiefly worried by what we might describe as 
the ambivalent character of premature efforts to advance human rights in a divided international 
system. Although a supporter of many human-rights oriented US foreign policies,42 Morgenthau 
believed that in a state system characterized by power rivalry and deep inequalities, a principled 
defense of human rights by national governments could not consistently mesh with the pursuit of 
the national interest. Reasonable interpretations of the national interest might still conflict with a 
strict human rights-oriented foreign policy; policy makers would inexorably be forced to make 
unfortunate compromises and tragic choices. Even if moral cosmopolitanism demanded that 
                                                            
40 For example, Habermas’s (cosmopolitan) The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge, USA: MIT Press, 2001), and 
especially his social‐democratic vision of a reformed EU. 
41 Hans J. Morgenthau, Human Rights and Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 
1979); Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, pp. 93‐5.  
42  He argued vociferously in the 1970s in favor, for example, of making US Soviet policies conditional on the 
acceptance by the Soviet leadership of the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate. 
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political actors vigorously pursue human rights, the best that could reasonably be expected of 
nationally-based political leaders would be that they minimize sad but unavoidable compromises. 
How could one plausibly expect of present-day political leaders that they sacrifice power and 
privilege for moral goals from which their own populations did not benefit and in fact might 
suffer? Although easily misunderstood, Morgenthau was not attacking the admirable quest for a 
strengthened human rights regime, but instead the view that nationally-based political leaders 
could readily and indeed consistently do so in an international system that placed structural 
restraints on such efforts. A principled commitment to universal rights might require nothing less 
than massive and perhaps immediate economic redistribution, for example, yet any political 
leader in a rich country who undertook to do so would surely get driven no less immediately 
from office.   
   Morgenthau also noted that under contemporary international conditions the 
interpretation and enforcement of human rights remained plagued by selectivity and partiality in 
enforcement typically favoring the great powers. When nation-states pursued policies under the 
mantle of human rights, they did so in self-interested and narrowly egoistical ways: the United 
States, for example, has generally advanced an interpretation of human rights reflecting its own 
idiosyncratic (anti-statist) national political traditions.43 Yet these reservations hardly constituted 
a principled attack on the quest to strengthen the enforcement of human rights. On the contrary, 
they implicitly highlighted the limitations of human rights-oriented policies in the context of a 
Westphalian system, Morgenthau tirelessly repeated, which humankind should work towards 
transcending. 
                                                            
43 Think, for example, of longstanding US political hostility to social and economic rights.  
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III. The Realist Contribution to Global Democracy 
The gap between Cosmopolitanism and at least one significant variant of Realism is 
overstated: classical Realists and Cosmopolitans agree on many important matters. So where are 
the differences, and how might they prove intellectually useful as we pursue global reform? 
Cosmopolitans have recently advocated the establishment of extensive democratic 
decision-making “beyond the nation-state.” Unlike recent Realists, most classical Realists would 
likely have greeted this argument with some sympathy. Many of them similarly acknowledged 
the virtues of constructing a new system of global political authority; their anxieties about 
nuclear war made some of them at least as determined as contemporary writers in their advocacy 
of substantial global reform. Classical Realists also responded to an array of creative proposals 
for international reform, though pretty much forgotten today, advanced by global federalists and 
“one-worlders,” whose ideas became surprisingly popular in the late 1940s, and who at least for 
a brief historical juncture significantly shaped political and intellectual debate.44 So classical 
Realists were familiar with normative defenses of global democratic federalism and the world 
state, at least some of which anticipated contemporary Cosmopolitan proposals. Their own 
alternative account of global reform emerged in the context of a lively worldwide discussion in 
which activists, major political figures, and famous intellectuals –including Bertrand Russell and 
Karl Jaspers—avidly debated the pros and cons of competing models of international reform. 
 
44 Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953 
(Stanford: Stanford university Press, 1993); Wesley T. Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy: American Supranationalism 
Since World War II (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 3‐134. 
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Much of that debate today remains of mere historical interest. However, let me suggest 
that two pivotal classical Realist arguments developed in its context remain relevant to the 
contemporary discussion about global reform. The first (1) concerns the necessary social 
presuppositions of effective global political authority, as well as the closely related issue of how 
institutional change might be put into motion; the second (2) refers to the proper status of state 
sovereignty in a new global order. The classical Realists’ reflections on these matters admittedly 
remain incomplete. Yet they offer a fruitful starting point for developing a richer understanding 
of the perplexities of global reform than formulated by many present-day Cosmopolitans.   
     1.      
In the concluding section of his impressive Democracy and the Global Order, David Held 
asserts that a functioning global democracy will “not require political and cultural integration in 
the form of a consensus on a wide range of beliefs, values, and norms.” A cosmopolitan 
democracy might achieve a high level of integration and efficacy merely by citizens 
“participating in public deliberation and negotiation,” and this chiefly presupposes a basic 
“’commitment’ to democracy, for without this there can be no sustained public deliberation, 
democracy cannot function as a decision-making mechanism, and divergent political aspirations 
and identities are unlikely to reach an accommodation.”i 45 Because Held apparently believes that 
the “commitment to democracy” is nearly universal today, he offers a relatively sanguine 
account of cosmopolitan democracy’s prospects. Although it would be a mistake to try instantly 
to construct full-fledged global democracy, political actors can and should undertake far-
                                                            
45 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 282. Held’s proposals have been discussed at great length elsewhere 
by many scholars; I will not cover familiar territory here.  For a recent Cosmopolitan endorsement, see Caney, 
Justice Beyond Borders, pp. 148‐88. 
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reaching institutional alterations to the status quo.46 Humankind, it seems, is pretty much ready 
and willing to embrace global democracy, and “in the wake of, for instance, a severe crisis of the 
global financial system, or of the environment, or of war,” far-sighted reformers might 
legitimately undertake institutional change at “extraordinary speed.”47  
Trying to counter communitarian-inspired models of political community and identity, 
Held and many other Cosmopolitans outline what Craig Calhoun has accurately described as a 
“thin conception of social life, commitment, and belonging.”48 Indeed, this thin conception 
contrasts sharply with the ideas of defenders of the nation-state like David Miller, who criticize 
cosmopolitan reform proposals by insisting on a thicker model of social integration and 
motivation, arguing that a viable political community presupposes a far-reaching sense of trust, 
fair play, and an almost spontaneous willingness to cooperate voluntarily among compatriots. In 
successful political communities, citizens typically follow the rules even when they could get 
away with not doing so, in part because they expect that others will heed them as well: a 
desirable liberal democracy can rely only to a circumscribed degree on state coercion, so it must 
count on citizens to heed “STOP” signs even when no police officer happens to be lurking 
around the corner. In Miller’s view, a mere “commitment to democracy” is insufficient to the 
integrative tasks at hand. Instead, the requisite communal ties are generated most effectively by a 
 
46  For Held’s ambitious list of short‐term measures, see Democracy and the Global Order, 279‐80. 
47  Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 281. 
48  Craig Calhoun, “The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing 
Cosmopolitanism,“in Debating Cosmopolitics, ed. Daniele Archibugi (London: Verso, 2003), 96. Habermas seems to 
endorse a similarly thin view (see Postnational Constellation, pp. 73‐6, 100‐2), as Winfried Thaa observes in a 
useful article (“’Lean Citizenship’: The Fading Away of the Political in Transnational Democracy,” European Journal 
of International Relations 7 [2001], pp. 503‐23). 
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robust shared national identity, which many existing nation-states –to varying degrees, 
depending on historical particularities—have in fact relied on to secure the preconditions of 
political freedom and social justice. In light of the numerous ways in which political life is 
necessarily parasitical on particularistic national identity, the call for far-reaching cosmopolitan 
reform remains an irresponsible panacea.49                    
Like such critics, classical Realists would have expressed concern about the thin account 
of “social life, commitment, and belonging” found among contemporary global democrats. They 
also would have raised tough questions about “how social solidarity and public discourse might 
develop enough” in postnational social relations to become the basis for global governance.50 
Without succumbing to rigid and sometimes essentialist ideas of community or nationhood, or 
overstated expectations about democratic participation and citizenship, they at least hinted at the 
possibility of an alternative and somewhat “thicker” account of social integration. 
Morgenthau and Niebuhr regularly criticized “one-worlders” and postwar defenders of 
international reform for privileging “top-down” institutional and especially constitutional change 
and for exaggerating the integrative capacities of political institutions. Both thought that 
effective reform would have to start from the “bottom up,” meaning that its advocates should 
focus on figuring out how the basic social presuppositions of effective global institutions could 
be built and gradually strengthened over time. The enormous fascination Mitrany’s functionalist 
vision exercised among mid-century Realists derived from its claim to mark out a refreshingly 
                                                            
49 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 90‐7. 
50  Calhoun, “The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers,” p. 96. 
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down-to-earth reform alternative:51 nation-states would cooperate in pursuing concrete 
(economic and technical) tasks, developing along the way creative but eminently practical 
supranational institutions. By “linking authority to a specific activity” or function, novel modes 
of international organization could begin to “break away from the traditional link between 
authority and a definite territory.”52 Such cooperation would generate new supranational forms 
of social practice, shared norms, and complexes of political interest; the preconditions for global 
governance could be prepared. The central task facing global reformers was not the transfer of 
national sovereignty by means of constitutional formulas, but instead piecemeal policy reform 
which might someday transform the true seat of sovereign power. Of course, there was room 
here as well for institutional creativity and conscious political intervention, but only as part of a 
broader package of innovations that worked towards establishing a sufficiently robust sense of 
shared postnational political and social life. In contrast, a premature push for institutional or 
constitutional reform at the global level potentially put the cart before the horse and would 
necessarily prove counterproductive.  
For the Realists, most models of global reform rested on a one-sided Hobbesianism 
according to which the state alone can “maintain domestic peace….That the state is essential, but 
not sufficient to keep the peace of national societies is demonstrated by the historical experience 
of civil wars.”53 Any working global political authority presupposed a highly developed 
“supranational society” or “world community” capable of accomplishing demanding integrative 
                                                            
51 See also Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, 326‐27; Schuman, Commonwealth of Man, pp. 296‐43, for 
other discussions of international functionalism. 
52  Mitrany, A Working Peace System, p. 6. 
53 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1st. Ed.), p. 397.  
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tasks presently performed more-or-less automatically by successful nationally-based 
communities.54 Stable political systems rested on a widely shared expectation of fairness or basic 
justice, which alone encouraged participants to respect the basic rules of the political and social 
game even when particular outcomes seemed threatening. The employment of coercive power 
could be minimized because “organic forces of cohesion” operated in subtle and oftentimes 
easily overlooked ways; naïve models of global government ignored them because their 
defenders generally took them for granted.55 Social cleavages and loyalties would have to be 
crosscutting, impressing on social actors the fundamental “relativity of their interests and 
loyalties.” This “plural role of friend and opponent” reduced the potential explosiveness of group 
conflict: a rival in one social arena might be an ally or friend in another.56 For this reason as 
well, successful political communities only had to rely on coercive force in exceptional 
circumstances. At the domestic level, a complicated array of social and political mores, nor
and social practices typically brought about peaceful transformations of public opinion. Of 
course, formal state institutions then sometimes worked to translate public opinion into legally-
binding political and social change. Yet state institutions remained limited “agents of societ
whole.”57 Without a far-reaching basis in a complex set of community practices, laws wou
prove ineffective: “laws are obeyed because the community accepts them as corresponding,” an
not first and foremost because of the specter of state force
 
54  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations ( 2nd. Ed)., p. 479. 
55 Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 25. 
56 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (2nd. Ed.), p. 471. 
57 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (2nd. Ed.), p. 414. 
58 Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 22. 
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Morgenthau and Niebuhr regularly noted that a sense of shared nationality, language, 
religion, political history, ethnicity, and even hostility to a foreign enemy had played decisive 
roles in creating a sufficiently robust “domestic society” and thus the presuppositions of existing 
forms of nationally-based political organization. Unfortunately, they had little to say about what 
might replace such ties at the level of an emerging supranational or world community. Yet this 
analytic vagueness arguably constitutes a hidden forte.  Nowhere did they a priori exclude the 
possibility that new forms of shared social life, commitment, and belonging might take a novel 
post-national form. They would likely have rejected the communitarian argument that global 
democracy must founder because it obfuscates the need for a thick sense of shared life based on 
the commonalities of nationality or a robust and widely shared “conception of the good.” 
Classical Realists bemoaned the fact that the nation-state and its particularistic identity remained 
“the recipient of man’s highest earthly loyalties”: for them, this was clear evidence of 
humankind’s moral and political immaturity. Even though the specific details of any prospective 
supranational society will necessarily look different from what we observe at the national level, 
they might plausibly have suggested, basic integrative functions will still need to be performed 
by global rather than nationally-based mechanisms. Unlike also recent republican critics of 
global democracy who worry that it conflicts with the preconditions of meaningful citizenship 
and effective self-government, the mid-century Realists defended sober models of representative 
liberal democracy and rejected the view that it demanded many intense forms of small-scale or 
even face-to-face participation.59 They never precluded the possibility that global political 
                                                            
59  For a subtle version of the republican view, see Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, “Between Cosmopolis 
and Community: Three Models of Rights and Democracy within the European Union,” in Re‐Imagining Political 
community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 152‐79.  For 
Morgenthau’s democratic theory, see Purpose of American Politics. 
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authority could be made consonant with liberal democratic aspirations, even if they rightly 
pointed out that familiar decision-making mechanisms –for example, majority rule—seemed 
highly problematic at the global level.60  
Yet classical Realists would also have worried that Held’s thin “commitment to 
democracy” is likely to prove insufficient to a robust cosmopolitan democracy. To be sure, 
democratic participation and negotiation make indispensable contributions to any shared sense of 
political belonging and commitment. Yet political life relies on additional social foundations 
about which global democrats have had far too little to say.61 A mere “commitment to 
democracy” does not a world community or supranational society make. Writing at mid-century, 
the classical Realists vociferously criticized the notion that such a supranational society had 
already sufficiently emerged to buttress global democracy. Although they never denied the 
possibility of a global public opinion “that transcends national boundaries and… unites members 
of different nations in a consensus,” they doubted that global public opinion was already 
adequately advanced to support global democracy.62 At the global level, not much of a 
politically efficacious shared sense of fairness could be identified, and national identities still 
trumped the cross-cutting cleavages that would have to operate there, as at the national level, if 
supranational political institutions were to prove durable. Unfortunately, most residents of t
globe still believed “that the national characteristics they have in common are superior in all 
 
60  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd. Ed.), p. 480. 
61  This theoretical lacuna also plagues Kai Nelsen, “World Government, Security, and Global Justice” in Problems of 
International Justice, ed. Steven Luper‐Foy (Boulder: Westview, 1988), pp. 263‐82. 
62  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd. Ed.), p. 236. 
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important respects…to the qualities of those who belong to different nations.”63 They remained
first and foremost Americans, Indians, and Russians, and only “citizens of the world” as an 
To be sure, Cosmopolitan advocates of democratic reform might legitimately poin
that in the last half century huge steps have been taken towards creating a deeply roote
supranational society. Global public opinion and civil society have gained in political 
significance; a host of shared norms, institutions, and complexes of interest (e.g., the UN, EU, 
IMF, WTO) have built on and simultaneously deepened humankind’s sense of a shared fate and 
indeed membership in a global community. Yet legitimate grounds for skepticism remain. In par
this stems from the fact, astutely predicted by the classical Realists, that globalization pro
at least as many new sources of political conflict and enmity as it suggests the virtues of 
overcoming old ones. Despite occasional claims among Cosmopolitans to the contrary, there is 
simply no reason to presuppose that globalization’s contradictory social, economic, and cultural 
dynamics inexorably lead the way towards more sensible forms of global governance: however 
desirable and rational such reforms might be, political actors –and in particular rich and powerfu
nation-states systematically privileged by the global status quo —will continue to oppose m
normatively attractive demands for reform and especially the call for global democracy. In 
responding skeptically to reformers of his day, Morgenthau appealed to John Stuart Mi
famous tripartite test of support for any workable government from 
l 
any 
ll’s 
Considerations on 
Representative Government: will people accept it, be willing to do what is necessary to keep it 
                                                            
63  Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (2nd. Ed.), p. 471. 
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standing, and allow it to fulfill its purposes?64 The refusal of many members of the global 
community --and not simply the US—to support even modest reforms to the Security Council, or
to fund the UN adequately or support its peace-keeping operations, should at least put a damper 
on overblown reform expectations. We continue to subscribe to the universal “rights of man” 
(and women), but when refugees arrive at our doorstep, we slam the door on them. We shrug our 
shoulders when reminded that tens of thousands of (foreign) children die daily of curable illness, 
while keeping our eyes glued to televised news broadcasts blaring out reports about the fate of a
ed in a plane crash, or subject to criminal attacks abroad.     
Daniele Archibugi claims that those who bemoan the lack of a global demos miss the 
crucial point that “institutions create the demos.”65 This argument risks confirming some
worst anxieties of Realists like Morgenthau and Niebuhr. Institutions obviously have an 
important role to play in supporting any political community. Yet Archibugi is claiming more: h
implies that constitution-making and institutional reform can effectively create their own social 
and political presuppositions. Taking the US founding as evidence, he conveniently downplay
the fact that the post-1787 US system only emerged after a bloody revolution had forged the 
colonists into a unified people, and that the US Constitution tellingly begins with a preamble
declaring its purpose to be the establishment of a “more perfect union”: it indeed built on a 
previous union, and presupposed far-reaching political, moral, and cultural commonaliti
predated the Philadelphia Convention and even the American Revolution.
es that 
                                                           
66 This naïve 
 
64  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd. Ed.), pp. 477‐81. 
65 Archibugi, Global Commonwealth of Citizens, p. 143.  
66  Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, pp. 24‐5. 
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constitutional fetishism also opens the door to a paternalistic reformism in which purportedly far-
sighted actors are outfitted with the task of creating global democracy –despite the admitted lack 
of a global dem
cal Realists were 
right to war tional reform.  
be 
os or even significant evidence that something like it may be emerging. 
Global democracy remains an admirable long term aspiration. Yet classi
n of the perils of premature constitutional and institu
      2. 
Classical Realists accused postwar global reformers of ignoring the decisive role to 
played by a mature supranational society in buttressing a prospective cosmopolitan polity. 
However, they also adamantly endorsed the “true message of Hobbes’s philosophy” that th
is insufficient yet still “indispensable for the maintenance of domestic peace.”
e state 
 
ed even by 
, to 
                                                           
67 A global 
political order would have to be able to mobilize preponderant or overwhelming power against
lawbreakers, and this would ultimately require locating the legitimate monopoly of organized 
violence in (global) state hands. Even if existing international law was widely respect
the great powers, in the context of explosive conflicts it too often stalled because its 
decentralized structure delivered “the enforcement of the law to the vicissitudes of the 
distribution of power between the violator of the law and the victim of the violation.”68 So 
Hobbes was right to link the regular enforcement of law to the establishment of sovereign state 
institutions capable of forcefully employing their institutional muscle to enforce norms against 
the powerful and privileged as well as the weak and vulnerable. Hobbes was wrong, however
tie his defense of sovereignty to an Absolutist vision of politics and law. “Sovereignty is not 
 
67  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd. Ed.), p. 476. 
68  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd. Ed.), p. 270. 
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freedom from legal restraints,” Morgenthau bluntly declared, because the effective mobilization 
of preponderant power resources against lawbreakers --the core element of the idea of 
sovereignty-- by no means demands that state institutions be envisioned as operating beyond or 
outside the law, or that they literally possess “supremacy” in the sense that no social restraints o
them can be identified.
n 
ll 
ercion, even if their 
exceeding 71
 
69 Too often, critics of state sovereignty distorted its lasting insights by 
associating it with misguided and unnecessary connotations. Well-meaning global reformers, for 
example, advocated seemingly attractive models of differentiated or divisible sovereignty. In the 
process they downplayed the unsettling fact that any working global political and legal order wi
need possession of supreme authority and thus a core feature of state sovereignty as classically 
interpreted. Viable federal states like Switzerland or the United States, Morgenthau insisted 
against those who took them as models for a novel “post-sovereign” global order,70 established 
binding political and legal mechanisms for the mobilization of preponderant power against both 
domestic and foreign challengers: it was wrong to interpret them as evidence for the possibility 
of effective political authority operating without a monopoly on organized co
ly complex constitutional dynamics admittedly veiled this fact.    
Classical Realists typically insisted that any viable system of global governance would
ultimately need to take the form of a global government possessing key attributes of mod
statehood. Otherwise it would prove unable to guarantee the equal or at least consistent 
ern 
                                                            
69  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 291. 
70 This type of argument, by the way, is still made for Switzerland by many global reformers. See, for example, 
Hauke Brunkhorst, “State and Constitution –A Reply to Scheuerman,” Constellations 15 (2008), 494. 
71  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 303‐8, 473‐77, 482‐85. Not also the implication of the Realist view that 
the aspiration for a world state is consistent with competing institutional variants –including a federal state. 
32 
 
ures recourse to the state’s legitimate monopoly on organized violence 
would rem
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eignty, the conceptual backbone of the modern 
state, is acco 74
enforcement of law, or the systematic implementation of general policies even when opposed by 
powerful political and social interests. Supranational society could contribute significantly to the 
integration of such interests so as to reduce the necessity of employing police and military force. 
However, at crucial junct
ain essential. 
Even some hitherto enthusiastic defenders of the presently fashionable idea of “global 
governance without government” have recently begun to concede the basic soundness of this 
position.72 Nonetheless, many Cosmopolitan political reformers reject it. For example, Archibugi 
and Held repudiate the suggestion that their ambitious models of cosmopolitan democracy po
to the necessity of a global or world state. Archibugi contrasts his model favorably to that of 
competing ideas of a global federal republic by asserting that it successfully circumvents th
ominous specter of a world state outfitted with a centralized monopoly on violence. Final 
coercive power would be “distributed…among several actors and subjected to the judicial 
control of existing and suitably reformed international institutions.”73 This is achievable, he 
insists, because cosmopolitan democracy allegedly demands entrusting only a “minimal list” of 
regulatory tasks to global institutions. State sover
rdingly criticized and discarded.    
A glance at Archibugi’s anything but minimal list, however, immediately complicates 
matters. Global institutions would be given authority to regulate the use of force, strengthen the 
                                                            
72 Thomas Weiss, What’s Wrong with the UN and what can we do about it? (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2008), pp. 215‐
33. 
73  Archibugi, Global Commonwealth of Citizens, p. 129. Also, Held, Democracy and Global Order, pp. 230‐31. 
74  Archibugi, Global Commonwealth of Citizens, p. 89. 
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self-determination of peoples, secure cultural diversity, monitor the internal affairs of states to 
ensure fidelity to democracy and human rights, and encourage the “participatory management 
global problems.”75 His proposal calls for a massive augmentation of global decision making 
authority but no corresponding increase in global-level state enforcement capacities. So wha
happens when a reformed UN, for example, tries to enforce the legal prohibition on torture 
against the US or other great powers which decide to violate it? Or when redistributive social an
economic measures are supposed to be pursued even in opposition to an (outvoted) minority
powerful rich countries? How the dispersion of coercive authority along with a world cou
al executive) could ever get the job done remains unexplained.  
The classical Realists were probably right to insist that a normatively attractive as well
viable cosmopolitan polity will have to rest on core elements of modern statehood.76 This, o
course, was a major reason why they conceived of it as representing a distant –though still 
normatively meaningful-- goal: powerful states in particular are unlikely to rush to hand over 
core attributes of sovereignty to novel supranational institutions over which they will possess 
relatively limited authority. Another crucial reason for their advocacy of world governm
that they believed, like Pogge and other contemporary Cosmopolitans, that the terrible 
destructiveness of contemporary weaponry called for its “centrally enforced reduction and 
elimination,” which in the nuclear age was “much less dangerous than continuing the statu
quo.” Such a reduction indeed seems improbable if it remains directly dependent on “the 
                                                            
75  Archibugi, Global Commonwealth of Citizens, pp. 88‐89. 
76  In a similar (and refreshingly unfashionable) vein, see Glyn Morgan, “Democratic Equality, Transnational 
Institutions, and the Constraints of Modernity” in Bruce Morrison (ed.), Transnational Democracy in Critical and 
Comparative Perspective (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 187‐90. 
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voluntary co-operation of each and every national government.”  Nonetheless, they would 
almost certainly have criticized Pogge’s version of the Cosmopolitan critique of state 
sovereignty, according to which the centralized regulation of weapons of mass destruction is 
consonant with what he describes as a “vertical dispersion of sovereignty” and therefore requires 
no movement towards a world state. To be sure, power at the global level as elsewhere rests on 
many sources, military or otherwise. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to fathom the possibility 
of global institutions exercising an effective monopoly over legitimate violence –and this is 
ultimately what Pogge is advocating-- without them in fact gaining a preponderant power status 
in relation to their national institutional rivals.   
77
78
To be sure, the theoretical and practical issues raised by the concept of state sovereignty 
remain exceedingly complex especially as they relate to global reform. However, Pogge 
reproduces at least some common Cosmopolitan misunderstandings about it.79 He mistakenly 
associates state sovereignty with a normatively troublesome as well as empirically implausible 
idea of legally absolute authority, whose anachronistic character is purportedly demonstrated by 
successful federal states which allegedly already disperse sovereignty.80 Sovereignty, it seems, is 
ultimately little more than an anachronistic Hobbesian leftover that has already been overtaken 
by institutional practice. Unfortunately, the argument downplays the decisive point that 
                                                            
77  Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” p. 103. See also Morgenthau, Purpose of American Politics, pp. 169‐
73, 308‐9. 
78 This is surely one reason why the great powers have been so reluctant to strengthen the Security Council in 
minimal ways, let alone outfit the UN with nuclear weaponry.  
79  See also the critical comments in Jean L. Cohen, “Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law,” Ethics 
& International Affairs 18(2004), pp. 1‐24. 
80 Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” pp. 98‐103. 
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successful federal states possess clear legal and political, as well as underlying social and 
cultural, devices for mobilizing preponderant power resources to resolve dire conflicts: citizens 
in most federal states do not in fact “live in permanent danger of” constitutional crises, as Pogge 
idiosyncratically suggests, merely because of the constitutionally based separation of powers 
between the executive, legislative, and judiciary.81 The idea of state sovereignty is consistent 
with a variety of institutional models and far-reaching institutional differentiation as long as 
effective devices for marshalling superior power resources remain operative. For the global arena 
Pogge accordingly proposes that “persons should be citizens of, and govern themselves through a 
number of political units of various sizes, without any one political unit being dominant and thus 
occupying the traditional role of the state.”82 A multilayered Cosmopolitan political order 
apparently can do without a world state.83 Here as well, however, the question of how potentially 
explosive conflicts between and among competing political units could be effectively resolved 
absent an overarching –and universally binding—system of general law, supported by global 
institutions exercising fundamental state or at least state-like functions, is never sufficiently 
sketched out. 
IV. Conclusion 
This essay has tried to make a number of arguments, none of which is likely to cheer 
significant constituencies within present-day international political theory. In opposition to 
 
81 Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” p. 100. 
82 Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” 99. 
83  See also Habermas, Divided West, pp. 132‐39. 
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contemporary mainstream Realists, I have argued that Realism’s mid-century founding fathers84 
embraced powerful ideas consistent with Cosmopolitan political theory as now practiced. 
Contemporary Realists need to rethink their knee-jerk hostility to Cosmopolitanism. Against 
Cosmopolitanism, I have suggested that its standard account of (classical) Realism is one-sided 
and simplistic. Once we move beyond the intellectual shadow boxing we can begin to see how 
classical Realism might provide useful correctives to otherwise appealing Cosmopolitan reform 
ideals. Admittedly, the news on that front remains sobering. The admirable goal of a global 
(democratic) order presupposes a functioning supranational or world society, which we probably 
still lack. Anyone serious about democratic global governance will need to think hard about the 
ultimate necessity of a global or world state, which hardly seems to be on the immediate political 
horizon. 
For those understandably impatient for overdue global reform, this conclusion will 
inevitably seem unsatisfactory. Yet it surely remains better to look the hard tasks of reform 
directly in the eyes than pretend that global democracy can be constructed without also building 
its fundamental prerequisites. A house without a sturdy foundation is unlikely to remain standing 
for long. As Morgenthau warned global reformers half a century ago, suggesting that one might 
build such a house would be “tantamount to the advice to close one’s eyes and dream that one 
can eat one’s cake and have it, too.”85         
         
    
 
84  Readers should excuse the sexist language: as far I can tell they were in fact all men. 
85  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (2nd.ed.), p. 308. 
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